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STATISTICS IN THE COURTROOM: BUILDING
ON RUBINFELD
Richard Lempert *
INTRODUCTION

As the use of statistics in litigation has burgeoned and as more
complicated statistical techniques have entered the courtroom, concern
for the way courts use statistics has mounted and efforts to instruct law
yers and judges on the wise use of statistics have begun. Professor
Rubinfeld's paper 1 is a contribution toward this end. Two ideas at the
core of this paper are particularly important if we are to develop a more
satisfactory approach to the use of statistics2 in the courtroom. The
first is Professor Rubinfeld's caution against the talismanic use of the
.05 level of significances as a test of what aspects of a statistical study
are important to a legal factfinder. The second is his call for more at
tention to sensitivity testing than is customary in litigation research. 3
I.

SIGNIFICANCE TESTS

For a decade I have questioned the unthinking use of the .05 level
• Professor of Law and Sociology, University of Michigan. A.B. 1964, Oberlin Col
lege;J.D. 1968, Ph.D. 1971, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Paul Meier for
reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper. I took enough of his com
ments to heart that the paper is improved for his having read it, but not so many as to
make him responsible for anything that is said herein.
1. See Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1048 (1985).
Until recently Dan Rubinfeld and I were colleagues, and we are still friends. When Dan
was at Michigan his paper would have given rise not to a paper in reply but to a lunch or
two and numerous cups of coffee during the course of which we both would have
learned a good deal and probably changed our minds on several issues. I far prefer the
eating and edification format to the more formal relation of paper writer/discussant, and
it is in this spirit of conversation that I write. I am interested not in tearing down any
thing Dan has said but-even when I shall criticize specific arguments-in thinking
about how to build on what Dan has written.
Indeed, some of what I write which appears most critical does not question Dan's
current views. I received a copy of the final version of Dan's article only as I was about
to return the final version of my article for transmission to the printer. Consequently, I
am using some of Dan's earlier arguments and examples-to which he may now not
subscribe-as vehicles to advance arguments I wish to make. Dan is such a solid scholar
that I am sure he won't mind if I make him occasionally a straw man. I will alert the
reader when I do so.
2. "Econometrics" is at once too fancy, too discipline bound, and too narrow to be
the term of choice.
3. By litigation research I mean empirical research that has been specifically under
taken to address issues raised by the case at bar. Thus, if the X company is sued for sex
discrimination, a study of the X company's files to determine whether they systematically
underpay their female employees would be litigation research. Expert testimony based
on published studies about sex discrimination in the industry would report the results of
social science research but not the subset of that research that I call litigation research.

1098
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of statistical significance to evaluate the importance of empirical research results to legal proceedings. In an earlier article, I noted that
the values of social science are not the values of law, and that the .05
level reflects the social scientist's conservatism with respect to Type I

error.4 This concern with minimizing Type I errors makes sense for

social science purposes because independent replications, the best
check against unreliable results, are seldom done. But what makes
sense in social science may not in law. Statistical significance and substantive significance do not necessarily coincide; the likelihood of a statistically significant relationship varies both with sample size and the
appropriateness of the statistical procedures. Moreover, the law may

explicitly attach values to both Type I and Type II error that have important implications for the level of significance we should demand.
Professor Rubinfeld largely shares these views. He acknowledges

that both more and less conservative standards than the .05 level can be
appropriate on occasion. However, like most good statistical experts
who discuss the probative value of statistical evidence, he appears more
concerned with the mistake of giving weight to statistical evidence that
has little probative value than he is with the mistake of dismissing statistical evidence that does not achieve the .05 level yet is reliable.5 The
law, however, seems to have made just the opposite determination.
The Federal Rules of Evidence define as relevant all "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."6 Surely statistical evidence that is significant at the .10 level or even the .50 level often meets this test.
The Federal Rules of Evidence nonetheless suggest two grounds
for excluding evidence that does not reach some minimal level of statis-

4. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and

theJury-Size Cases, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (1975). But Paul Meier notes:
In the history of the development of statistical methods .05 was most emphati-

cally not regarded as "conservative." To R. A. Fisher, anything not significant

at the two-sided 5To% level is not entitled to credence as evidence at all. "Significant at the 5%o level" was for him merely suggestive, "significant at the 2%o

level" was plausible, and only "significant at the 1 To% level" could be considered
convincing. I share his view. Remember that real effects don't usually hover at
the border of statistical significance. Most of them are statistically unambiguous (as is most evidence of discrimination).

Letter from Paul Meier to Richard Lempert (Jan. 16, 1985) (emphasis in original) (on
file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review).

5. Interestingly, the former mistake is analogous to Type I error and the latter to
Type II-perhaps what we see in these analyses is simply the statistician's habit of paying
more attention to Type I than to Type II questions carried over to policy analysis. My
characterization of Professor Rubinfeld's views applies more to the draft version of his
article, see Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom (Oct. 1984) (on file at the offices
of the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Rubinfeld Draft], than it does to the
current version.

6. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added).
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tical significance. First, Rule 703 provides that an expert may rely on
evidence not otherwise admissible, but only if the evidence is "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject . . . . "7 To this we may add
the test of Frye v. United States,8 still treated by some courts as good
law,9 which holds that scientific evidence will not be admitted unless its
scientific validity is generally acknowledged by professionals working in
the appropriate scientific field. 'O Arguably, experts of various sorts (be
they from statistics, sociology, economics, or any other field) would
neither rely on statistical results that fail to reach the .05 level of significance nor acknowledge the validity of conclusions based on statistical
evidence that does not reach this level, so under either Rule 703 or the
Frye test the evidence could be excluded as an unfit basis for expert
testimony. These evidentiary rules should not, however, be interpreted
in this way, for as I have already pointed out the values leading social
scientists to establish .05 as the conventional mark of statistical significance are not those of law. Not only do social scientists have reasons to
be especially concerned with Type I (as opposed to Type II) error, but
scientists have the luxury of withholding judgment on an issue, a luxury
which courts lack. For example, a careful scientist who fails to reject a
null hypothesis because the coefficient on the crucial variable differs
from zero at only the .15 level would not thereby conclude that the null
was true; rather, he would reserve judgment on the issue. Courts, by
contrast, typically must decide between two competing alternatives. If
the law fails to reject its equivalent of the null hypothesis because the
evidence pointing in this direction is not sufficiently convincing, it effectively regards the null as established. Thus, while statistical scientists properly determine the acceptable ways of conducting statistical
tests, courts should not defer to conventional scientific judgments
about when statistical evidence merits attention."
The second possible ground for barring statistical evidence that
has not met some significance level criterion is Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which provides that relevant evidence may be ex-

cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its tendency
to waste time, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. Clearly the ten7. Fed. R. Evid. 703.

8. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

9. See, e.g., United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983).
10. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

11. This does not mean that statistical experts have nothing to offer on the issue of
what to make of evidence that fails to achieve (or indeed exceeds) a conventional level of
statistical significance. Their expert views on the implications of such evidence may provide helpful or even essential guidance. But if this is to be the case, the expert's discussion must reflect the context in which the evidence is offered and the values involved
rather than decontextualized conventional wisdom. The root of the problem is, I think,
that courts are engaged in a decisionmaking task for which a Bayesian approach to statistics is more appropriate than a frequentist one. See infra text accompanying note 15.
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dency of statistical evidence to prove the point on which it is offered'2
diminishes with declining statistical significance, and the likelihood that
it will waste time increases.13 In addition, statistical evidence based, as
it is, on unfamiliar mathematics has a natural tendency to confuse
nonmathematically trained factfinders. This confusion arguably increases as the statistical significance of the evidence declines, since the
possibility that the evidence will be overweighted if any attention is
given it increases.
One problem with the Rule 403 objection is that any statistical evidence carries with it a risk that it will be overweighted or otherwise
confusing to the jury.'4 Indeed, calling evidence that reaches the .05
level "significant," even if the qualifier "statistically" is added, may lead
to confusion or overweighting, since lay factfinders are likely to find it
difficult to separate statistical and substantive significance, although
there is no simple association between the two.
More fundamentally relevant evidence should be excluded only as
a last resort if confusion is the problem. The first resort is to attempt to
clear up the confusion. One possibility is that information pertaining
to significance levels might be excluded. Arguably, for litigation purposes (and most other decisionmaking tasks), an explicitly Bayesian ap-

proach should be taken.'5 To pursue the issues that this possibility
raises would, however, involve us in a debate whose merits I am not

going to rehearse here. Let me simply note that the Bayesian perspective is unlikely to transform the way statistical data is evaluated for litigation purposes at any time in the foreseeable future. Economists,
sociologists, and others will continue to run their significance tests, and
they will continue to inform factfinders of the results.
A second, less radical alternative, which I espouse, is to change the

12. I am assuming in this discussion that one party offers statistical evidence to
prove a fact and the other party argues that the evidence should not be received or does
not tend to prove that fact because while the evidence points in the direction of the fact
it does not achieve statistical significance. It is also possible that a party contesting a fact
will seize on the insignificance of a particular result to argue that a contested fact does
not exist.

13. Indeed, it may be that at a certain point the relevance of statistical evidence is
unknown. For example, in an equation testing for sex discrimination, is evidence that

the coefficient on the sex variable is in the predicted direction, but significant at only the
.30 level, more consistent with discriminatory or nondiscriminatory defendant behavior?
If the relevance of evidence is so unclear that the jury can only engage in ungrounded
speculation about what it implies, that evidence may be excluded under Fed. R. Evid.
402 as irrelevant even though, properly understood, the evidence would have some ten-

dency to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L.
Rev. 1021, 1029 (1977).
14. I am not concerned with underweighting since this would give the opponent of

the evidence no cause to object.
15. For applications of Bayes Theorem, see, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian
Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1970); Lempert, supra note
13, at 1022-32.
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way that juries are informed of the results of significance tests whenever
data appear to have evidentiary value. If the significance or nonsignificance of a variable is truly important to the litigation, the factfinder
should not be told of a significance level and then left either to be awed
by the variable's importance (if it is significant) or to dismiss it (if it is
insignificant) or to try to puzzle out what the significance level really
means. Instead, the implications of a significance level for Type I and
Type II errors should first be explained to the factfinder. Then, the
statistical evidence should be presented both in terms of what the
strength of the relationship implies for the possibility of these two types
of error and in terms of the plausible substantive implications of the
variable, given the level of statistical significance.'6
The analysis to this point is consistent with Professor Rubinfeld's
suggestions. I part company from him, however, when he suggests that
levels of significance be chosen with an eye toward litigant or expert
behavior.'7 As an example of where this perspective can lead and the
problems with it, consider Rubinfeld's suggestions in an earlier version
of his paper that we choose a low significance level "when the cost of
litigating certain types of cases is likely to be high for all prospective
litigants," and to compensate for the possibility that experts will engage in model searching.'8 I find both the value and empirical judgments that are implicit in these suggestions questionable.
Litigation that requires statistical expertise is already expensive.
One would expect this fact alone to be a substantial disincentive to litigate. I fail to see why a further disincentive should be established for
such cases. Indeed, fee-shifting statutes have been passed because we
think that certain kinds of expensive litigation raise issues that should
be brought to court. 9 If we think that other kinds of expensive litigation are not worth the cost, let us change the substantive law to preclude such battles entirely. Or, if that is more discouraging than we
wish to be, let us raise the burden of proof directly for all cases rather
than raise it indirectly and haphazardly for cases that rely on statistical
evidence.

In addition, only plaintiffs are likely to be discouraged from litiga16. This should probably be presented in terms of a range of values. For example,
after explaining the 95To% confidence interval, the judge might say, "If the model used is
correct, we can conclude with this degree of confidence that being a woman costs a clerk
at company X between $.16 and $.96 an hour in wages."

17. See Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1063. The argument was considerably stronger
in the draft version of Professor Rubinfelds' paper which stimulated these reflections.
18. See Rubinfeld Draft, supra note 5, at 18-19. There are echoes of Professor
Rubinfeld's views in the current version, see Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1063, but
enough has changed that my discussion should not be seen as criticism of Professor
Rubinfeld. Instead I am using his earlier, tentative suggestions heuristically, since his
earlier views raise interesting issues that merit discussion.
19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-5(k) (1982) (court may allow reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII suit).
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tion by the suggested change. With statistical evidence barred because
it meets, say, only the .05 rather than the .02 level, defendants might
fight cases that they would promptly settle if the statistical evidence

were admissible. The more general point is that in thinking about the
incentive effects of rules regarding statistical evidence on litigant behavior, one cannot assume that the statistical evidence is either the only
or the most important evidence in the case. Thus the effects of changing the threshold of admissibility for statistical evidence are not
obvious.
To change the level of required significance to prevent model
searching would, of course, penalize those experts (or the clients of

those experts) who do not search. Indeed, it might encourage model
searching. The expert who specifies in advance a well thought-out
model and finds that the crucial coefficient is significant at the .05 level
when the court, to prevent model searching, has said it would not treat
a finding as important unless the .02 level is reached will, no doubt,
proceed to examine less well thought-out models in the hope that in
one of them the crucial coefficient will reach the .02 level. Indeed, the
expert might not feel this is unprofessional since the court has set the
more stringent level to take into account model searching behavior.20
If there is a problem with model searching, and I agree with Professor Rubinfeld that there is, there is a better solution. It is the one he

identifies.2' This is to require the expert to disclose all model searching conducted. It also requires that lawyers learn to question experts
on discovery about model searching and that lawyers learn what this
implies for attained significance levels and how to communicate this
information to triers of fact.22
II. SENSITIvITY TESTING

With respect to sensitivity tests, I generally endorse the approach
20. In the general case the more stringent level may mean that evidence from the
Nth model tested, which is the first to achieve statistical significance, is more probative
than the evidence from Model "N-M" which is the first to attain some less stringent
level of statistical significance. But this is not necessarily true. First, it depends on the
magnitude of "N-M"; that is, on how many more models are searched in an effort to
achieve significance under the more stringent standard. Second, the evidentiary value of

a coefficient significant in the predicted direction at the .05 level in a well thought-out
model may be greater than the evidentiary value of a coefficient significant at the .01
level in a poorly considered model.
21. See Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1073, 1095.
22. While I am giving Professor Rubinfeld credit for a solution, I should also give
him credit for what may be the strongest argument against manipulating significance
levels to affect litigant or expert behavior. This is that there is no constant relationship
between statistical and substantive significance. Thus, to manipulate significance levels
to achieve the desired end would be to eliminate more substantively important but less
statistically significant evidence in one case, while allowing in more statistically significant but less substantively important evidence in another.
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taken in Professor Rubinfeld's article. I have only a few brief ideas to
add. The first is that sensitivity testing can be for those fighting the
implications of statistical evidence something like model searching is

for those who offer it. One seeking to dismisss the results of a statistical analysis can explore different models until he or she discovers a
variable or a transformation or a technique that reduces the crucial coefficient in the opponent's analysis to statistical insignificance and then
can tell the court that the opponent's analysis is useless because it is
sensitive to an omitted variable, functional form, the presence of outliers, or the like. But demonstrating such sensitivity does not show that
the opponent's work is useless. If the opponent's model is theoretically
sound and the alternative is theoretically implausible, the fact that the
model is sensitive to the selected specification is no reason to suspect
its validity. Even when the alternative specification is theoretically plau-

sible, if the original specification is well thought-out, the sensitivity
analysis does not totally undercut the opponent's statistical case. It
merely suggests the need for caution and, more valuably, directs the
factfinder's attention to a crucial theoretical disagreement that must be
resolved to evaluate the competing claims.
The legal community could use explicit guidance from
econometricians and others about when sensitivity to basic specification
decisions is likely to seriously undercut the implications of particular
regression results and when it is likely to be less important. In giving

such advice, however, statistical experts must hold in mind that the
law's values may differ from scientific ones. Consider, for example, an
equal payment sex discrimination case in which the plaintiffs regression analysis is sensitive to several outliers: women who, despite relatively high education and experience, earn rather low incomes.
Omitting these outliers might reduce the negative impact of sex on
earnings to a point where it is no longer statistically significant.23 A
social scientist aware that some unmeasured variable may explain the
outliers' positions might argue that omitting them provides a "truer"
picture of the likelihood that the company discriminates on the basis of
sex. Yet, it may be that the outliers are outliers precisely because they
were victims of sexual discrimination.
To eliminate the outliers because it is good social science to be

wary of outlier-dependent regressions may be to eliminate what is
properly among the plaintiffs strongest evidence in the case.24 For example, consider the process of setting a Bayesian prior to bring to the
analysis of data suggesting that, other things being equal, women in a
high-tech company are paid on the average a little bit less than men of
the same education and experience. One might set the prior quite low
23. See Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1070.

24. It is the wariness and not the solution that is good social science. This wariness

should lead to an attempt to understand why outliers exist and thus to deal with the data
appropriately. Arbitrarily ignoring outliers is no solution to the problems they pose.
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on the theory that modern companies in competitive environments
have no history of discrimination and little to gain from it. Now sup-

pose that it can be shown from independent evidence that at least three
women in the company had been dramatically discriminated against be-

cause of their sex. Clearly, one would raise one's prior after learning
that the company discriminated in some cases, and it becomes more
reasonable to suppose that a male bias is pervasive.

Of course, in the typical regression analysis, one would not know
why the three women are outliers. To eliminate them is to assume

either that their position is not the result of sex discrimination or that,
if it is, their situations are so unique that their treatment has no bearing

on how to interpret the data pertaining to the pay of other women.25
The alternative, of course, is not to avoid a sensitivity analysis. Rather,

it is to argue that the implications of the analysis should be discussed

carefully in light of the legal values at stake. In particular, it is to emphasize that "cookbook" approaches of all sorts, even if accepted as
general rules for social science, must be rethought in the context of
particular cases and the legal and value issues they involve.
My second point is closely related. Sensitivity testing is a way of
evaluating the risks in relying on the implications of a particular statistical analysis. If crucial regression results are sensitive to functional form
or the presence of an omitted variable, we rely on the results at our
peril, for if the reality we seek to portray is more properly captured by

an alternative specification than by the original model, the original results may offer a substantially distorted picture of what is occurring.
This suggests that we search for models which on theoretical
grounds are sufficiently compelling that we are justified in relying on

them even if related specifications yield rather different outcomes. As
social scientists trying to advance social theory this is difficult. Rarely, if

ever, do we know enough about the world we are investigating to say
that it is no cause for concern when a plausible alternative specification
yields results that are substantively different from those of our original

model. For example, if we are trying to understand how salaries are
determined in company X, we might test a regression model that includes variables for sex, experience, supervisory responsibility, hours
worked, job classification, and performance ratings, but not education.
If the coefficient on the sex variable were significant and suggested that
women were meaningfully disadvantaged, we might provisionally conclude that company X discriminated against women. However, if adding education as a variable reduced the sex coefficient to the point
where it was no longer significant, we would probably conclude that the
worker's sex was not important to an understanding of how salaries

25. A daring defendant might argue that such evidence tends to show that the other
women employees were not discriminated against, because when this company discriminates the effects are clear to all.
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were set, although education did matter. Alternatively, we might argue
that the company did discriminate on the basis of sex, but that the relationship between sex and education in the company's workforce was

close enough that including education as a variable suppressed the ef-

fect associated with sex. On statistical grounds, we could not choose
between these explanations.
In litigation, however, the law's normative system may allow us to

specify models that are for the purposes of the case at hand not vulnerable to this kind of indeterminacy. For example, suppose we ask the
management of company X what variables they consider in setting salaries and they list all the variables we mention above except sex and
education. We ask, "What about education?" and are told "It's not
considered. We're interested in what workers do on the job and not in
how much book learning they have." Then we run our regressions and
find that sex apparently matters when added to the other variables we

have identified, but not if education is added as well. The sensitivity of

our model to education arguably has no implications for the reliability
of the results suggesting sex discrimination. The company has told us

explicitly that education is not considered, and we have no good reason
to believe that it is.26
Alternatively, education may be a proxy for such factors as performance ratings, which the company does not deny taking into account. But if we have adequately measured all these factors the value of
the proxy is lost. Even if we have not measured all such factors, there
remains the question of what the company can measure. If, for example, education affects job performance in ways not captured by our vari-

able "performance rating," this will not threaten our conclusion of sex
discrimination if bureaucrats set salaries within the company, and their
only available measure of performance is performance rating scores.27
Thus, in choosing between model specifications for the purposes of liti-

26. The company has also told us that sex is not considered, but we have reason to

believe it is. It is also possible for the company to discriminate without knowing it, and,
knowing or not, the company has a substantial incentive to deny any influence of sex.
Furthermore, it may be appropriate to hold the company to what it says it is considering
since we expect salaries to be set according to a rational policy of which the company is
aware. We are doing this when we hold it accountable for the effects of sex discrimination, which is illegal, and do not consider the possibility that salary setting on the basis
of education, which is legal, accounts for the lower salaries of female employees.
27. The law's norms may even, on occasion, justify a specification that we think is
mistaken. Suppose we have a company that employs large numbers of black women

relative to the number of blacks and women in its workforce. A model without race
included may suggest sex discrimination, but once race is included the effects of race
may be strong and those associated with sex may disappear. As social scientists we may

be reasonably confident that we have a case of racial and not sexual discrimination. Yet
in litigation a company may not be allowed to or may not want to defend a sex discrimination claim on the ground that it is really engaging in racial discrimination, even if the
result of disallowing that defense will be the award of damages to some white women
who were not in fact discriminated against.
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gation, there may be grounds for preferring one to another that would
not be available or would be more tenuous if one were simply seeking a
scientific understanding of what is going on. One implication is that
the law may misunderstand the real situation. The law, however, is in
the business of holding people responsible, and it is not only not obviously wrong as a matter of morality but it is clearly permissible as a
matter of law to hold people responsible for what they think and say
they are doing even if some otherwise plausible statistical tests suggest
that the reality is more benign than the party's own standards suggest.
It follows from this position that experts should work closely with
lawyers in designing statistical models, for it may be possible to design
models that are legally more robust than sensitivity analyses might
indicate.
Finally, there is a point that applies both to model searching and
sensitivity analyses. Professor Rubinfeld properly calls for experts to
reveal both the models they have tested and the sensitivity testing they
have done. But such calls are not self-enforcing. In addition, it is not
clear what should count as model searching or sensitivity testing. Ex-

perts commonly look at their data from various perspectives in deciding
how best to approach the analytic task. What exactly should be
revealed?

Ideally it might seem that experts should be required to keep all
hard copy they generate in the course of their various analyses and

make it available to the opposition. But this "bright line" test may lead
to two types of problems. First, it might simply induce experts to print
out less hard copy. Results would be inspected on the screen, but unless they aided the client's case, hard copy would not be generated. On
the other hand, if every test analysis was preserved and transmitted to
the opposition, the opposing side might make far more out of casually
done exploratory testing than the data merit. In the hands of a deft and
unscrupulous cross-examiner the results of quick and casual exploratory testing might easily be blown up in importance, and the factfinder
might be led to believe that the expert's theoretically sound, well
thought-out tests were contradicted by other work the expert had done
and were designed to hide earlier adverse results.
I do not have any easy answer to these problems. I expect that how
well we do in dealing with them will turn in large measure on the ethics
of expert witnesses, the ethics of attorneys who employ and cross-examine them, and the ability of attorneys both to understand what statistical experts are doing and to communicate that understanding to triers
of fact. I also expect that if we want experts to act ethically and disclose
the model searching and sensitivity testing they have done, it would
help if we had a clear statement of exactly what activities tending in
these directions should be disclosed. It might also help if we had some
system for periodically reviewing the behavior of experts to determine
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whether the standards set had been met and perhaps to sanction ex-

perts and attorneys for willful failures to comply.
Thus far, I have attempted to build on themes that Professor

Rubinfeld develops in his paper. Now I would like to suggest two
themes that are largely missing from his paper which, in my opinion,
figure importantly in his mission of helping us think more clearly about
the use of statistics in litigation. They are, first, that when statistics are
used in court, they are being employed in the context of an adversary
system, and second, that statistical experts, like all important witnesses,
must attend to how their testimony fits into the story that the client is
attempting to tell. A consideration of these themes qualifies portions
of the message that Professor Rubinfeld conveys.
III. AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

Litigation, as experts are often all too painfully aware, is in this

country an adversary proceeding. This fact has implications for almost
every aspect of expert testimony and bears importantly on such matters
as the ethical standards that should be demanded of experts, the best
modes of presenting statistical testimony, and the desirability of employing "neutral" court-appointed experts. In this Article, however, I
shall attend to only one way-indeed, to only part of one way-in which
the existence of an adversary system might affect our analysis of what to
expect of statistical experts in court.
In an adversary system, failure to respond to an opponent's argument is itself an important piece of information. This means that the

statistical standards that we might impose on a social scientist advancing a scientific hypothesis may be less necessary or even inappropriate
in the context of litigation. This is particularly likely when the information costs of the two parties are markedly different.
To illustrate this by example, consider Professor Rubinfeld's dis-

cussion of Melani v. Board of Higher Education,28 and his suggestion that
on a department by department basis, male and female faculty at City
University of New York (CUNY) might have been paid the same, but
the average salary of female faculty might have been substantially less
than that of male faculty because women may have been clustered in
departments (like education) which, because of external market forces,
have low salary scales, while men were clustered in departments (like
engineering) that have higher ones.29 Professor Rubinfeld suggests
that the plaintiffs in Melani may be criticized for failing to control for
departmental appointment in their regression analysis. Professor
Rubinfeld's critique would clearly apply if the study in question was an
ordinary social science investigation. Surely, we would want a social
28. 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). For Professor Rubinfeld's discussion, see
Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1068-69.
29. See Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1069.
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scientist seeking to determine why CUNY's female faculty were earning
less on the average than their male counterparts to consider the possibility that women were clustered in departments with historically low
salary scales. But in the adversary context, it may be less important to
demand this. If the defendant fails to pose the possibility that departmental status might explain apparent sex-based discrimination or, if
having raised the possibility, the defendant fails to test for it, the defendant's failure is itself reason to believe that a consideration of this
plausible nondiscriminatory explanation would not exonerate the defendant. The case for resting the burden of introducing plausible alternatives on the defendant is particularly strong if, as will often be the
case, the defendant is in a better position than the plaintiff to identify
plausible nondiscriminatory explanations for apparent discrimination.
Arguably CUNY was in this situation, for at least at the outset of the
litigation, they must have known better than the plaintiffs how women
faculty were distributed across the University and how market forces
affected the salary structures of different departments.
The problem is general. It also applies to Professor Rubinfeld's

suggestion that it is often desirable to test the probability of evidence
under the null hypothesis of no discrimination against the probability
of that evidence under some specifically hypothesized mode of discrimination rather than against the vague alternative of discrimination in
any form.30 As Professor Rubinfeld's example demonstrates, his pre-

ferred approach can aid either the plaintiff or the defendant depending
on the data and the alternative posed. Ordinarily this is reason enough
to put the burden of advancing specific alternative hypotheses and testing their plausibility vis-a-vis the null hypothesis on the party likely to
benefit from this approach. If this party chooses not to proceed in this
fashion, it is fair to assume that the procedure either is not appropriate

in the given case or that it would not substantially alter the import of
the other evidence.

One can, however, push this argument about the adversary system

too far. Complexities arise, especially when multiple regression is an
appropriate methodology, and the question is which party is responsible for evaluating the effects of which variables. To draw on an exam-

ple that Professor Rubinfeld used in an earlier version of his paper,3'
assume that the proportion of women hired for a particular position is
substantially less than the proportion of women in the company's applicant pool and that the job in question requires substantial education as
well as previous job experience. In these circumstances the disproportionate underrepresentation of women among the company's hirees is,
at best, only weak evidence of discrimination. It may be explained by
the fact-if it is a fact-that female applicants are less experienced or
30. See the discussion in Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1055-59.
31. See Rubinfeld Draft, supra note 5, at 16.
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less well educated than their male counterparts. Who should bear the
burden of testing this possiblity? Many would unthinkingly place this

burden on the plaintiff. I would argue that given the law and the adversary system, this placement is usually but not always correct.

First, consider the situation where the defendant has immediate access to the data needed to test nondiscriminatory alternative hypotheses (i.e., that experience or education explains the underrepresentation
of women), and will not provide the plaintiff with all relevant information, or will only provide relevant information in a way that promises to
make the analysis unnecessarily expensive.32 In these circumstances, I
think the burden of showing the plausibility or implausibility of the employee value hypothesis properly rests on the defendant, and if the defendant presents no data disproving the plaintiff's contention, the
factfinder may properly conclude that the data would not have disproved it.

The situation is arguably the same where the crucial data is equally

accessible to the plaintiff and the defendant or-where the defendant will
cooperate in giving the plaintiff access to the data. What is to be lost by
forcing the party claiming nondiscrimination, rather than the party
claiming discrimination, to introduce evidence on the plausibility of alternative hypotheses? Arguably, putting this burden on the defendant
will give a greater "nuisance value" to the plaintiffs claim, and the defendant may be willing to settle for more than the plaintiff deserves33 to
avoid the expense of the analysis that may defeat the plaintiff's case.
But, by the same token, the plaintiff who must test the plausibility of the
alternative hypotheses may settle for less than she deserves in order to

avoid the expense of the alternative hypotheses analysis that might
strengthen her case. I see no basis for choosing between the parties on

this ground. Moreover, if, as will usually be the case in employment
discrimination litigation, the defendant has better access to the data

needed to test the "job qualification" hypothesis and knows more
about how the data have been coded and computerized, forcing the
plaintiff to test for the rival hypotheses will introduce unnecessary
transaction costs.

Nevertheless, where the data are equally accessible, I think the

plaintiff should be responsible for first testing the effects of certain variables, like measures of education and experience, that may explain an
apparently discriminatory hiring pattern. The reason is that the law's
normative model of discrimination does not label as discriminatory
those situations in which women are less frequently hired or paid less
than men. The label is limited to situations in which women are disad32. The defendant might have the data on employee education and experience on
tape for internal management uses, but rather than provide the tape, he delivers a truckload of personnel files for the plaintiff to code.
33. By this, I mean the plaintiffs expected damages times the probability the plaintiff will prevail.
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vantaged for reasons that have nothing to do with permissible

predictors or measures of a person's likely or actual job performance.34
Simply demonstrating that women are paid less than men does not

show this. Nondiscriminatory explanations for gross hiring or wage
disparities between the sexes are in the general case sufficiently plausible that the plaintiff should ordinarily35 be required to evaluate a model
that contains a reasonable set of plausible predictors of job performance in order to establish a prima facie case on the basis of statistical
evidence.36 This obligation does not, however, extend as far as the scientist's obligation ideally extends. So long as the plaintiff's model contains a reasonable set of plausible predictors,37 the burden should be
considered met. If the defendant believes that other rival hypotheses
are important, the defendant properly bears the burden of collecting
the data and running the tests necessary to support other exonerative
theories.38

Ultimately the scope of the plaintiff's obligation to specify and test
hypothesized alternatives to the null hypothesis that do not entail dis-

crimination (e.g., that wage disparities reflect job-related educational,
rather than sexual, status) is and should be set by legal, not statistical,
norms. Nevertheless, since both law and statistics are usually sensible

disciplines, the standards of both will often point in the same direction.
IV. TELLING A STORY

Professors Bennett and Feldman argue that a trial is, in essence, a
34. The word "permissible" is important, and serves to emphasize the difference

between models designed to test legal theories and those designed to test social science
theories. Assume, for example, that sex is an important predictor of stockbrokers' sales
because people are generally more willing to buy stock from men than from women.
Nevertheless, a correlation between sex and sales would not justify setting women brokers' initial salaries lower than those of men. To do so in anticipation of future sales
would be considered sex discrimination.
35. The obligation might be excused or pared down if the necessary data are un-

available or unduly expensive to analyze, at least if those conditions are due to the defendant's noncooperation.

36. To the extent that "legitimate predictors" explain apparently invidious dis-

crepencies, this placement of the burden is likely to lead to a failure to bring suits or an
earlier end to litigation that, from the plaintiff's point of view, would in any event have
floundered after the defendant's statistical analysis. An early end to litigation that was
not going anywhere should save both plaintiffs and defendants money, although in some

cases particular plaintiffs may be worse off, for they may be confronting defendants who
would settle on the basis of gross evidence of discrimination without doing their own
controlled statistical analyses.
37. I assume the plaintiff has not generated this set by discarding variables which
when included tended to support the rival hypothesis.

38. I would put in this category the theory in Melani that departmental affiliation
explains sex-linked wage disparities, but I would not fault a judge who decided the other
way. One might reasonably argue that this explanation is so plausible, easy to test, and
obvious that the plaintiff should have borne the burden of considering the effects of
departmental status.
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contest of stories.39 Individual witnesses tell their own stories, which
the proponent of their evidence tries to weave into a larger, coherent

whole and the opponent tries to negate. Ultimately, the party that
prevails will be the party whose story makes the most sense to the
factfinder. Statistical experts, like other experts, should seek to tell

their stories in ways that make sense to the trier of fact and fit in with
the stories of other witnesses to form a convincing whole. In particular,

an expert should remember that however convincing he or she finds
the statistical evidence after months or even years of being immersed in
the data, the statistical evidence is unlikely to be the whole story.
Where a factfinder rejects what is to the expert a convincing statistical
case, the constructive reaction is not to condemn the factfinder's blindness, prejudice, or ignorance. Rather, it is to ask how the story could
have been better told. Often the exercise will reveal that the factfinder
acted rationally, given the way the story was told. Thus, Professor
Rubinfeld gives sound advice, both technically and as a matter of persuasion, when he cautions that [evaluation of statistical results cannot
be accomplished by the use of any single test statistic. Ideally, findings
should allow the trier of fact to make independent inferences based on
information relating to both statistical and practical significance."40
His example of translating a statistically significant coefficient on the
sex variable in a wage discriminaiton case into an expectation of lost
wages is also sound, for it is a way of helping the factfinder make sense
of an otherwise difficult to understand statistic that fits nicely into the
story that one party wants to tell.
This, however, is an easy example. It is statistically and literally an
exercise in translation, and as such it may not alert us to more subtle
problems that can arise. Consider, for example, Professor Rubinfeld's
detailed discussion of the work he and Peter Steiner did in the ampicillin case.4 i It is an impressive piece of work,42 yet, however appropriate

and fine the statistical analysis is on its own terms, as a story something
is lacking. To better explain what I mean, let me pose as a typical
factfinder. In this guise, I do not know very much about the drug business, but I have noticed in shopping that generic brands of drugs are
generally priced lower, and sometimes much lower, than their name
brand counterparts. I also do not know much about economics, but if
there is one lesson I recall from my introductory economics course, it is

that market competition lowers the price of goods. Now Professors
39. See W. Bennett & M. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Jus-

tice and Judgment in American Culture 4, 41-66 (1981).
40. See Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1068.
41. See Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1078-87.

42. My major reservation is that I think the model should have included detailed
information about when drugs that compete with ampicillin entered the market and how
their prices changed over time. While the time variable may be intended as a proxy for
such effects, I am not satisfied, both because of the likely looseness of the fit and the fact
that the price information on competitive drugs should have been available.
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Rubinfeld and Steiner tell me that excluding generic drug companies
from the ampicillin market did not noticably increase the prices that

governmental agencies paid for the drug. The net result is that I, as a

typical juror, am impressed by Professor Rubinfeld's careful analysis
and awed by the credentials that he and Peter Steiner present, but totally apart from the plaintiffs competing analysis, I am not convinced.
Nor is my reaction completely irrational. There is a good statistical
defense that may be made. In Bayesian terms, my familiarity with generic drugs and the dynamics of competition means that once I learn
that numbers of generic drug companies were excluded from the
ampicillin market I rationally set a high prior probability on the likelihood of some price effect, so high that even after I learn of and understand the defendant's statistical results, I nonetheless rationally
conclude that the plaintiff has proved its case by a preponderance of
the evidence.

The defendant's story in the ampicillin case was "There was no
effect." That's not much of a plot. What the defendant should have
done to make sense of the statistical results was to explain why, in the
context of the wholesale drug market of the late 1960's, additional
competition from generic houses should not have been expected to affect substantially the price of ampicillin sold to cities, counties, and
states. With this information I would have revised substantially my
Bayesian prior, the statistical analysis would have made more sense,
and I would have decided for the defendant. To put the point another
way, econometricians should remember that one of their comparative
advantages in litigation (vis-a-vis statisticians, for example) is that they
are also economists. Econometricians analyze data. Economists tell
stories.
V. LEX REGIS

I have touched on a number of issues in this commentary, although
I have by no means exhausted the potential for building on Professor
Rubinfeld's paper. If there is any general theme to my comments it is
Lex Regis: when econometrics or any other statistical specialty enters
the courtroom, the law is king. The law's norms and values ultimately
determine what models are appropriate, what questions should be
asked of data, how burdens should be allocated, and what various statistical results imply.43 Let me return one last time to the earlier draft
of Professor Rubinfeld's paper to illustrate this point. He gives an ex43. I am not saying that statistics cannot or should not inform the law of what good
statistical analysis entails or how a statistical expert would interpret particular results. A

strength of the law which we see in its increased receptivity to and understanding of
regression analysis and other modern statistical techniques is that like a good ruler it is

educable. I am only saying that when legal standards clash with or reinterpret statistical
standards, it is the law which does and should prevail.
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ample44 of twenty firms in an industry, the hiring practices of which are

being scrutinized by employees who feel they were wrongly denied offers of employment. He stipulates that the firms hire independently of
each other and do not consider sex or race. He suggests that it would
not be surprising to find that a careful statistical analysis of the hiring
practices of the firms leads to the conclusion that one of the firms has

been guilty of discrimination. The context is novel, but the point is
familiar and sound. If one looks at twenty independent random samples for an effect, it is not unusual for one to find a sample in which the
effect appears at the .05 level simply as a result of random variation.
Yet extending this proper statistical caution to the legal context is
nonetheless problematic.

I have two problems with the example involving statistical issues

that I shall only note in passing, and a third that is more intriguing and
makes the point I want to emphasize here. First, I simply note that in
the real world where we cannot know by assumption that companies are
not discriminating, there is likely to be much less danger that a careful
statistical analysis will, because of chance factors, mistakenly suggest
discrimination. Even if companies hire independently, investigations
into discrimination are not started, and are certainly not pursued to the
point of a trial, at random. It is an empirical question, but I expect that
before a case reaches the point of a substantial investment in a careful
statistical analysis (often at the expense of the plaintiff's attorney), it
appears to someone that there is a high prior probability that the defendant company has been discriminating. Thus, the danger that we
shall label random processes discriminatory is likely to be substantially
less than the analogy to the familiar paradigm of twenty independent
tests suggests. But Professor Rubinfeld avoids this problem by stipulating that all twenty of his firms are innocent, and so long as we bear in
mind the relationship of the example to the real world, I have no
qualms about accepting the stipulation.
My second difficulty with the illustration is that I still wonder where
the random element comes from. If it exists because sample surveys
were done at each company, I accept Professor Rubinfeld's point fully,
but the problem is no longer interesting in that there is an easy cure
which is to look at the population data. If population statistics were
examined in each company, some would question whether significance
tests are appropriate at all. However, I will assume with Professor
Rubinfeld that significance tests are useful as an indicator of whether
relationships suggesting discrimination might plausibly result from the
essentially random effects of unmeasured variables, and that it is appro-

44. See Rubinfeld Draft, supra note 5, at 20-22. The current version has an analogous example, see Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1064, but it does not illustrate my point as

well. The statistical criticisms I make of the example I draw from the earlier draft also
do not apply to the current version because the argument is not pushed as far.
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priate to treat this situation as akin to the randomness associated with
probability sampling.
This brings me to my third point. Assume that the statistical analy-

sis Professor Rubinfeld posits has been carefully done, in that all obvious job-related variables have been well measured and included in the

regression equation. Consider the situation Professor Rubinfeld has

described. Women are substantially underrepresented in a company's
workforce. The underrepresentation cannot be explained by the com-

position of the applicant pool or by the job-related credentials and

skills of the women applicants, for we included measures of these in our
model. Instead, if we could only know, we would find that-purely by
chance-women (as compared with men) were more often interviewed
by those employment officers least willing to hire; were more likely to
apply for work when business was slack, more often had their interview
disrupted by phone calls to the interviewers, and the like. In short, the
business was blameless. Yet it does not follow that the law should listen
to the "randomness" defense that exonerates it.
Assume, for example, that the applicable statute forbids discrimination, that discrimination ordinarily implies intent, and that the defendant can show that in some recent period twenty investigations into

the hiring practices of area firms were started and only the investigation
into the defendant's hiring practices yielded evidence of discrimination.
I concede that on these facts a social scientist should not conclude that
the firm was discriminatory in its hiring. Yet I believe that a court
might appropriately hold that if a plaintiff presents a careful statistical

analysis suggesting substantial discrimination and if the defendant by
way of defense can do no more than suggest that the discriminatory

effect in the plaintiff's model may be due to the chance effects of unmeasured variables, the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict-that
is, to be declared the victor as a matter of law.
First, to show the possibility of randomness is not to demonstrate

its existence, and to show that it is more likely than not that twenty
independent investigations will yield one case in which a crucial association is by chance significant is not the same as showing that it is more
likely than not that the one significant relationship found resulted from
chance.

Second, if we are concerned that women are discriminated against
in the workplace for reasons related to sex, we may not wish to compound the underrepresentation by the bad luck of the disfavored
group. Whether the substantial underrepresentation of women in the
firm we are investigating resulted from intent or chance, we may, for
many of the same reasons we are opposed to sex discrimination, still
wish to have the company increase the proportion of women in its
workforce to about the proportion of qualified women in its applicant
pool.

Third, for purposes of deterrence we may not want to allow a com-
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pany with a disproportionately small number of women employees to
appear untouched by the legal process. Other companies with a propensity to discriminate may thereby be emboldened to do so. Moreover, to allow the defense of randomness may mean that companies
that are in fact discriminating escape by using it, thus doing injustice in
particular cases and lowering specific as well as general deterrence.
This is not to say that there are no arguments in favor of allowing

the randomness defense. Chief among these is the fact that we may
think it unfair to stigmatize a company and penalize it through a back
pay award when it did not engage in any activity that selected women
out for disfavored treatment. Moreover, as Professor Rubinfeld points
out,45 to allow innocent companies to be held responsible for discrimination may induce many companies that do not discriminate to engage

in economically wasteful attempts to avoid the appearance of
discrimination.

However one resolves this value conflict, we should not lose sight
of the more general point: ways of thinking statistically with clear implications for social science-when we try twenty independent tests and
observe one significant result at the .05 level we do not shout "Eureka"-are not by that token directly transplantable to the litigation setting. Statistical experts can and should point to the problem, but what
to do about it is a question for legal policy makers. The law decides;
statistical experts must conform-not vice versa.
Ultimately, Professor Rubinfeld and I share the same concern. We
would both like to see courts make better use of the statistical evidence
that is with increasing frequency presented to them. This requires not
just more sensitive and sophisticated approaches to the statistical as-

pects of litigation research. It also-and more fundamentally-requires
that lawyers and statistical experts educate each other. Statistical experts must learn how their evidence articulates with legal values and
best fits into the structure of a case. Lawyers and judges must understand not the technicalities of statistical analyses, but the underlying
logic of the descriptions and tests that statisticians offer them. Members of each community must, in short, learn what it is to think like a
member of the other. It is to this end that Professor Rubinfeld and I
have written.
45. See Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1064.

